Gerasimov Doktrininin Hibrit Savaş Olgusu İle İlişkiselliğinin Rus Savaş Algısına Yansıması: Gürcistan Krizi

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Year-Number: 2022-62
Yayımlanma Tarihi: 2022-08-31 13:59:47.0
Language : Türkçe
Konu : Uluslararası İlişkiler
Number of pages: 1505-1517
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Abstract

Egemen devletlerin kurulumundan Soğuk Savaş’ın nihayetine kadar geçen sürede lineer savaşlar önemli savaş unsuru olarak var olurken, Soğuk Savaş’ın akabinde ikili yapının sona ermesi ve küresel boyut kazanan savaş teknolojileri sebebiyle lineer savaşların yıkıcı, şiddet boyutunun etkisi aktörler tarafından riske alınmaması gibi sebeplerle savaş faaliyetlerinde ciddi dönüşümler ve değişimler gerçekleşmiş; pek çok unsurun birlikte kullanılarak hasım aktörün güçsüzleşmesine odaklanan “Hibrit Savaş” modern savaş şekli olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. Gerasimov doktrini, hibrit yöntemlerin ve asimetrik savaş stratejisinin ilk uygulaması olmasa da bir ülkenin hibrit savaş terimini politik-askeri düzeyde ilk defa kabul etmesi, bu çerçeveye uygun bir yöntem oluşturması, taktiksel-operasyonel kurumların da bu politika ve yöntem etrafında biçimlendirilmesi ile eşsiz bir örnek teşkil etmesi bakımından oldukça önemli görülmektedir. Rusya’nın bu doktrinle birlikte savaş algısı değişmiştir. Gerasimov Doktrini ile Rusya’nın, askeri niteliğe sahip olmayan yöntemleri kullanarak daha az konvansiyonel güç ile daha az insan kaybı ve maliyet elde edip sıcak çatışma süreçlerini yönlendirmeyi ve yönetmeyi amaçlayacağı vurgulanmaktadır.

Buradan yola çıkılarak hazırlanan bu çalışmada, Gerasimov doktrini ışığında Gürcistan krizi incelenmiş ve bu vaka üzerinden Rus hibrit savaş yöntemlerinin etkisi sorgulanmıştır.

Keywords

Abstract

While linear wars existed as an important element of war in the period from the establishment of sovereign states to the end of the Cold War, the end of the dual structure after the Cold War and the war technologies that gained a global dimension, linear wars were destructive and the effects of violence were not taken at risk by the actors. serious transformations and changes took place in its activities; “Hybrid War”, which focuses on the weakening of the opposing actor by using many elements together, has come to the fore as a form of modern warfare. Although the Gerasimov doctrine is not the first application of hybrid methods and asymmetric warfare strategy, it is the first time a country has adopted the term hybrid warfare at the politico-military level, created a method suitable for this framework, and formed a unique example with the formation of tactical-operational institutions around this policy and method. appears to be quite important. With this doctrine, Russia's perception of war has changed. With the Gerasimov Doctrine, it is emphasized that Russia will aim to direct and manage the hot conflict processes by using non-military methods, with less conventional power and less human loss and cost.

In this study, which was prepared based on this, the Georgian crisis was examined in the light of the Gerasimov doctrine and the effect of Russian hybrid warfare methods was questioned through this case.

Keywords


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